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Dwelling in Doubt: Do Tenants Have a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the
Common Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?
Alexander Porro†

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution resolutely protects the right to
privacy and the freedom from government intrusion. The Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution provides: “The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”1 A search “occurs
when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed.”2 The profoundness of this guarantee of protection is demonstrated by its extension to both innocent and guilty
people alike.3 However, over the years, courts have disagreed over the
degree of protection that the Fourth Amendment affords.
Currently, the federal circuit courts are split as to whether a tenant who lives in an apartment has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the common areas of their building under the Fourth Amendment.
The First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that tenants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common
areas of their apartments.4 These Circuits reason that because common areas are open to people beyond the control of each tenant (e.g.,
†

B.A. 2013, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 2019, The University of Chicago Law School.
Many thanks to Professor Lior Strahilevitz for his guidance and insightful comments, The University of Chicago Legal Forum board and staff (both past and present) for their helpful edits and
suggestions, and my beautiful wife Alinna for her love and support.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
3
See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant tenant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their
apartment building); United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 188 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); Harney v.
City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 925 (7th Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971,
976 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).
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other tenants, delivery people, the landlord, other authorized individuals), they are not protected under the Fourth Amendment.5 These
Circuits also hold that, because common areas are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained by law enforcement officers
from these areas is admissible in court proceedings.
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit that recognizes that tenants
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their
apartment buildings, at least when the door is locked.6 The Sixth Circuit agrees that people beyond the tenants’ control can enter the common areas, but there is an actual expectation of privacy from the general public and trespassers.7 In 2001, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed this
holding, stating that “any entry into a locked apartment building
without permission, exigency or a warrant is prohibited.”8 Under the
Sixth Circuit’s approach, evidence accumulated by law enforcement
officers in common areas of apartment buildings is protected by the
Fourth Amendment, and thus inadmissible in court proceedings.9
This Comment will argue that while the position of the Sixth Circuit is preferable to the positions held by the majority of circuits, it is
still too narrow. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis could be made stronger
by incorporating other common law privacy doctrine-based arguments—namely, that the common areas in apartment buildings
should be considered part of a tenant’s curtilage. This Comment will
then argue that existing Supreme Court precedent and the curtilage
doctrine should allow courts to recognize that tenants do enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their apartment
buildings.
Further, this Comment will argue that extending Fourth
Amendment protections to common areas in apartment buildings is
good public policy. Treating privacy protections afforded to houses differently from those afforded to apartments could disproportionately
affect the poorest citizens in society and incentivize unjust law enforcement practices. In The Wire, we are exposed to this disparate
treatment when officers Carver, Hauk (“Herc”), and Pryzbylewski
(“Prez”) travel to The Terraces, a Barksdale-controlled high-rise public
housing project, in the middle of the night after feeling frustrated with

5

See United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977).
See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that a tenant has
a constitutionally protected privacy interest within the locked common areas of an apartment
building, and an officer’s entry into these areas without a warrant or permission violates the
Fourth Amendment).
7
Id. at 551.
8
United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001).
9
Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550.
6
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the progress of their case against the Barksdale drug operation.10 In
an attempt to intimidate the Barksdales, we witness all three officers
harass, threaten, and strip-search two innocent Terrace residents, one
of whom was simply carrying his laundry back to his apartment.11
Moments later, Prez encounters Kevin Johnston, a fourteen-year-old
kid, eating a bag of chips and mouthing off while leaning on the hood
of their police cruiser.12 Prez proceeds to pistol whip Johnston in the
face causing him to be hospitalized and ultimately, to lose his left
eye.13 This Comment believes that poorer law-abiding tenants, whose
lack of resources force them to live in crime-ridden apartment complexes, such as The Terraces, should not be subject to unreasonable
searches without probable cause. As such, law-abiding tenants could
benefit from a more accurate application of Fourth Amendment privacy protections to the common areas in (and around) their homes.14
Finally, this Comment will examine new perspectives that can potentially help resolve this circuit split. This Comment will first explore
alternative models of Fourth Amendment protection outside the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. In addition, this Comment
will argue that the determination of protections afforded to common
areas based on whether they are locked or unlocked is arbitrary and
should be eliminated.
Thus, the discussion proceeds as follows: Part II of this Comment
will provide an overview of the development of Fourth Amendment
protection and how it has been interpreted by courts, summarizing the
more notable decisions. Part II will then provide an overview of the
curtilage doctrine, its limitations, and a definition of “common areas”
for the purposes of this Comment. Part III will provide a summary of
the circuit split that currently exists in the federal circuits. Part IV
will argue that tenants should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their apartment building under the Fourth
Amendment by pointing to supportive Supreme Court precedent and
showing how the curtilage doctrine can fit into the current analysis.
Part IV will also examine the larger public policy implications of
granting unequal levels of Fourth Amendment protection to singlefamily homes and multi-unit dwellings. Finally, Part V will discuss
how exploring alternative models of Fourth Amendment protection
could improve circuit court analyses. In the end, this Comment hopes

10

The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 9, 2002) (Season One, Episode Two).
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
This could not actually be known without studying the effects of Fourth Amendment privacy rights expansion on crime control.
11
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to provide an updated perspective on this circuit split and address the
uneven distribution of Fourth Amendment privacy protection between
individuals living in single-family homes and those living in apartment buildings.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RELATED DOCTRINES
A.

Overview of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.15
The word “unreasonable” is not defined in the Constitution. As a result, there has been considerable debate over the scope of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
Further, “the application of the ‘exclusionary rule’ to evidence obtained in violation of the amendment has made the determination of
its protections a crucial, if not dispositive, issue in many criminal
prosecutions.”16
In attempting to outline the extent of Fourth Amendment protections, the courts have relied substantially on the trespass doctrine and
property concepts. This approach to the Fourth Amendment appeared
in Olmstead v. United States,17 where federal agents had obtained incriminating evidence by wiretapping the defendant’s telephones.18
Chief Justice Taft stated that the historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was to prevent the use of governmental force to search
and seize a man’s property and his effects.19 But, because there had
15

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
William J. Desmond, Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure—Warrantless Searches of
Private Areas in Locked Apartment Building without Permission Violate Reasonable Expectations
of Privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. KY. L. REV. 161, 163 (1977); see Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the warrantless seizure of items from a private
residence constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment; only applied to federal courts); see
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to state
courts as well).
17
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
18
Id. at 455.
19
Id. at 463.
16
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been no physical trespass, nor any seizure of “persons, houses, papers,
and effects,” the Court held that there was no search and seizure within the traditional meaning of the Fourth Amendment.20 Therefore,
there was no violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.21 Here,
the Court affirmed the doctrine of “constitutionally protected areas,”
determining that any search and seizure that resulted in a trespass of
a “constitutionally protected area” was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.22
However, after struggling to concretely define “constitutionally
protected areas,” the Court appeared to do away with property and
trespass considerations in Katz v. United States.23 Katz, like Olmstead,
concerned the wiretapping of a suspected criminal’s telephone call.
Specifically, the suspect in Katz was using a public phone booth to
place a call and the government had attached a listening device to the
outside of the phone booth.24 Rather than designating the phone booth
as a “constitutionally protected area,” the Court concluded that “the
reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure” and that
property interests and the “trespass” doctrine could “no longer be regarded as controlling.”25 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart famously stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”26
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated the two-pronged
test that courts ultimately adopted to determine whether there was
Fourth Amendment protection, stating, “My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”27 Finding the defendant’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable, the Court stated that
“[o]ne who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and
pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”28 In so holding, the Court abandoned the traditional

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at 466.
Id.
See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
Id. at 352.
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“trespass” doctrine and replaced it with a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test.
However, when the Court was unable to confidently apply the
reasonable expectation of privacy test in United States v. Jones,29 it
was quick to revive the physical trespass test. In Jones, the government attached a GPS tracker to the defendant’s car while it was
parked in a public parking lot after suspecting the defendant was trafficking drugs.30 The government tracked the vehicle’s movement for 28
days.31 The Jones Court held unanimously that attaching the GPS device constituted a search.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
highlighted the physical trespass of placing the GPS device on Jones’
car, noting that “[b]y attaching the device to the [car], [the] officers encroached on a protected area.”33 Justice Scalia also wrote that the reasonable expectation of privacy test had not replaced the trespass test;
rather it had merely supplemented it.34 Jones reiterates that a physical trespass may trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Jones also
stands for the proposition that one’s Fourth Amendment analysis
should begin by asking whether a physical trespass occurred, and if
not, then one should move on to applying Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy standard.
B.

The Curtilage Doctrine and Its Limitations

Inextricably linked with the aforementioned Fourth Amendment
doctrines is the concept of curtilage. At common law, “the curtilage is
the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”35 Classic examples
of curtilage include attached garages, back patios, and fenced-in backyards. Because the occupants of a home have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their home and the curtilage is considered as part of the
home, it is protected by the Fourth Amendment. This means that if an
area is considered part of a home’s curtilage, it cannot be searched by

29

565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Id. at 403.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 404.
33
Id. at 410; but see id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (making clear that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test “augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the commonlaw trespassory test that preceded it”); id. at 419–431 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that there
are problems with the property-based analysis and that the reasonable expectations of privacy
test is the sole determining factor as to whether government actions implicate the Fourth
Amendment).
34
Id. at 409.
35
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
30
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a law enforcement officer without a warrant, unless one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.36
The Supreme Court first incorporated the protection of curtilage
into the Fourth Amendment in Oliver v. United States.37 In Oliver,
Kentucky State Police officers traveled to the defendant’s farm upon
receiving reports that marijuana was being grown there.38 After ignoring a “No Trespassing” sign, the police officers proceeded to investigate the defendant’s farm without a warrant and found a field of marijuana over a mile from the defendant’s home.39 The Court stated that,
although the police officers trespassed on Oliver’s property, the trespass occurred in “open fields,” which were not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.40 The Court then went on to reaffirm the rule that “an
individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding
the home.”41 As such, the Oliver Court defined “curtilage” as “the area
around the home to which the activity of home life extends.”42
In United States v. Dunn,43 the Court elaborated on this definition
when presented with the question of whether a barn on the defendant’s property could be considered part of the defendant’s curtilage,
and thus part of the defendant’s home.44 In determining that the barn
was not “so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed
under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection,”45 the
Court outlined four factors that must be considered when determining
whether a space is part of the home’s protected curtilage: (1) “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,” (2) “whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,” (3) “the
nature of the uses to which the area is put,” and (4) “the steps taken
by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing

36

See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473
(1985) (stating that “there are over twenty exceptions to the probable cause or the warrant requirement or both”); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (stating that the curtilage is
“treated as the home itself” for Fourth Amendment purposes).
37
466 U.S. at 180–81.
38
Id. at 173.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 177–79; see Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (“the special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’
is not extended to the open fields”).
41
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
42
Id. at 182 n.112.
43
480 U.S. 294 (1987).
44
Id. at 296.
45
Id. at 301.
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by.”46 The Dunn Court was careful not to establish a bright line rule.47
Rather the Court reasoned:
We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a
“correct” answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather,
these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that,
in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to
the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment protection.48
Importantly, not all four factors are necessary for the Court to find
that the area in question is part of the home’s curtilage.49
Together, Oliver and Dunn represent the modern theory of curtilage. The Oliver “open fields” doctrine rests on the idea that expectations of privacy in areas far-removed from the home itself are not reasonable, regardless of whether those areas may be part of ones’ private
property. The Dunn factors attempt to identify characteristics of a
space that mark it as part of a home such that it is objectively reasonable to expect privacy there. Accordingly, curtilage (and reasonable
expectation of privacy) analyses tend to be based on the extent to
which an individual has tried to completely exclude others or obscure
from view the space in question. As the Supreme Court emphasized in
California v. Ciraolo,50 the protection afforded by curtilage is rooted in
“a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy
expectations are most heightened.”51 Thus, curtilage is ultimately
about protecting closely held privacy and security rights in the home.
However, the Court has recognized some limitations to the Fourth
Amendment protections granted by the curtilage doctrine. For example, in Ciraolo, the Court held that naked-eye observations by police
from an airplane lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet into
the curtilage of a home does not violate the reasonable expectation of
privacy that a resident has in that curtilage.52 Justifying the decision,
the Court explained that “Fourth Amendment protection of the home
46

Id.
Id. at 301 n.4.
48
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
49
See United States v. Seidel, 794 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (three of the four
Dunn factors were found to “militate in favor of the defendant”).
50
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
51
Id. at 213.
52
Id. at 213–14.
47
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has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield
their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares,”53 thus
supporting the idea that objects or activities set in plain view do not
enjoy privacy protection. Further, the Court has been reluctant to extend Fourth Amendment protection beyond the curtilage of the home.
For instance, in California v. Greenwood,54 the Court refused to grant
Fourth Amendment protection to garbage left for collection on the
curb because the curb was outside the curtilage of the home and “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public.”55
While there are plenty of interesting cases that weigh and balance
the four Dunn factors in considering whether curtilage applies to single-family homes,56 the more complicated Fourth Amendment question
is whether and how the concept of curtilage applies to multi-unit
dwellings—particularly the common areas within these dwellings.
This will be explored further in Section IV.A below.
C.

“Common Areas” Defined

Before examining the relevant circuit case law and the resulting
circuit split below, it is important to note that, for the purposes of this
Comment, the term “common area” will refer only to the common areas outside of the individual unit that a tenant would inhabit within a
multi-unit dwelling. Thus, the term “common area” will not refer to
the shared spaces inside of an individual unit such as a living room,
bedroom, bathroom, kitchen, closet or foyer. The term “common areas”
will refer to areas including, but not limited to, hallways, garages,
basements, laundry rooms, and storage spaces—all of which are usually accessible by the people living and working in the building. Although there are cases that address co-tenants’ rights to privacy within
an apartment unit and issues like whether a co-tenant can give permission to law enforcement officers to conduct a search of the shared
spaces within an apartment unit, such cases and issues are outside of
this Comment’s scope.
The federal circuit courts have looked at a number of different
“common areas.”57 Common areas have included hallways,58 under-

53

Id. at 213.
486 U.S. 35 (1988).
55
Id. at 40.
56
See, e.g., Harris v. O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 240–41 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s
fenced-in backyard constituted curtilage of their single-family home after going through the four
Dunn factors and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for their Fourth
Amendment intrusion into this curtilage).
57
See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2016) (basement); United
54

342

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2018

ground parking garages,59 and basement storage units utilized by residents.60 The circuit courts often face the difficult task of ascertaining
the extent to which Fourth Amendment protection should be given to
tenants based on which type of common area the protection would extend to and other particular facts in the case. The majority of circuits
reason that, because these common areas “are available for the use of
other tenants, friends and visitors of other tenants, the landlord, delivery people, repair workers, sales people, postal carriers and the
like,” tenants have little control over these common areas and thus, do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in these common areas.61
III. EXAMINING THE RELEVANT CIRCUIT CASE LAW
A.

The Majority Rule

Currently, the federal circuit courts are split as to whether a tenant who lives in an apartment has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the common areas of his or her building under the Fourth Amendment. The First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have used
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to hold that tenants do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of
their apartment buildings.62 The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to
reach the opposite conclusion.
The First Circuit addressed this issue in several cases spanning
from 1976 to 1998.63 The court ultimately concluded that “[i]t is now
beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the apartment building.”64 Initially, the Third Circuit established no objective reasonable expecta-

States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767–68 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal duplex hallway); United States
v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (shared entrance to apartment building).
58
United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976).
59
United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557 (1st Cir. 1976).
60
United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
Breland, 715 F. Supp. 7, 8–10 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that defendant’s claim to a protected privacy interest in a basement storage area was undermined by the unlocked door guarding the area).
61
Orin Kerr, Use of a Drug-Sniffing Dog at an Apartment Door is a ‘Search,’ 7th Circuit
Holds, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp
/2016/04/13/use-of-a-drug-sniffing-dog-at-an-apartment-door-is-a-search-7th-circuit-holds/?utm_
term=.0b9174e5d4c7 [http://perma.cc/M3DC-6A6V] (citing United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239,
1242 (9th Cir. 1993); Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1172; United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816
(8th Cir. 1977); Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d at 558).
62
See supra note 4.
63
For some First Circuit cases reiterating the majority position on this issue, see Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d at 557–78; United States v. Thornley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1983); Hawkins,
139 F.3d at 32–33.
64
Hawkins, 139 F. 3d at 32.
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tion of privacy in unlocked common areas in United States v. Acosta.65
Further, the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Correa66 extended Acosta’s rationale to locked common areas. The Third Circuit’s
approach is unique among circuits taking the majority position in that
it focuses almost exclusively on the ability of others to access the
space; it does not look at their reason for being in the building.67 The
unlocked-locked distinction will be addressed further in Section V.B.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the majority position in several cases spanning from 1991 to 2012.68 Together, these
Seventh Circuit cases establish that tenants are not entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of their apartment
buildings. For example, in Harney v. City of Chicago,69 when the police
entered an area that was partially blocked from public view, the court
concluded that “the fact that a gate barred—to some unknown extent—public viewing or access does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy in common or shared areas.”70
However, the Seventh Circuit held in a recent decision, United
States v. Whitaker,71 that, although a tenant does not have Fourth
Amendment rights in common areas generally, use of a drug-sniffing
dog in the hallway at the tenant’s door is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.72 Citing Justice Kagan’s concurrence in
Florida v. Jardines,73 it argued that a drug-sniffing dog is a “supersensitive instrument” that has the ability to detect objects and activities that are “not in general public use, to explore details of a home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”74 Although, the Seventh Circuit did not use the curtilage doctrine to come to its decision in Whitaker, the holding points to equal
Fourth Amendment treatment of houses and apartments.
The Eighth Circuit adopted the majority position in United States
v. McCaster75 and later reaffirmed it in United States v. Brooks.76 In
65

965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992).
United States v. Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating even locked exterior
doors do not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy in a building’s common areas).
67
See Kathryn E. Fifield, Let This Jardines Grow: The Case for Curtilage Protection in
Common Spaces, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 147, 167 (2017).
68
See Harney v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 924–25 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 723 (7th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
69
702 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2012).
70
Id. at 925.
71
820 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2016).
72
Id. at 853.
73
569 U.S. 1 (2013).
74
Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
75
193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999).
66
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validating its decisions, the Eighth Circuit referred to the plain view
doctrine, “which permits an officer to seize evidence without a warrant
when (1) the officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed, (2)
the object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent, and (3)
the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself.”77 The court
ultimately concluded that the backyard was a part of the curtilage of
the home and the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment in accessing that area during the search.78
Finally, the Ninth Circuit also takes the majority position and
holds that tenants lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
common area of their apartment buildings under the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Nohara,79 police officers observed the defendant holding a methamphetamine pipe in the hallway of his
apartment.80 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that he was
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway of his
apartment, and the evidence was ruled admissible.81 However, the
court did not determine the issue of subjective expectation of privacy,
concluding it unnecessary given that the objective expectation of privacy was unreasonable.82
B.

The Sixth Circuit Stands Alone

Among the federal circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit is the only one
that recognizes that tenants have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the common areas of their apartment not open to the general public.83 The Sixth Circuit first addressed this Fourth Amendment issue
in 1976 in United States v. Carriger.84 From late 1972 to early 1973,
76

645 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 565 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (8th Cir. 2009)).
78
Brooks, 645 F.3d at 975–76.
79
3 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993).
80
Id. at 1240–41.
81
Id. at 1241.
82
Id. (“It is unclear whether [defendant] had a subjective expectation of privacy in his building and hallway. However, we need not decide this issue because we conclude that any expectation [defendant] might have had is not one that society recognizes as reasonable.”).
83
See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976) (“The officer’s entry into
this locked apartment building without permission and without a warrant of any kind was an
illegal entry and violated appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). There is a Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976), which recognized a tenant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a common area. However, the Fluker court limited its holding to the
narrow set of facts in the case. Subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have chosen not to extend
Fluker, holding that tenants in multi-unit dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas; see Nohara, 3 F.3d at 1242.
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541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).
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Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) agents conducted
an investigation of Charles Beasley.85 Undercover agents had purchased a large amount of heroin from Beasley with the purpose of
identifying Beasley’s source, who BNDD had been led to believe was
Carriger.86 After following Beasley to Carriger’s apartment building,
the BNDD agents discovered that both of the apartment building entrances, one in the front and one in the back, were locked and could
only be opened by someone with a key or by someone in the building
who could activate the buzzer system.87 Later, as several workmen
were leaving Carriger’s apartment building, one of the BNDD agents
was able to slip in quickly before the door closed.88 Once inside, the
agent inside saw Beasley walking down a corridor with a green shopping bag under his arm, which appeared to have something in it.89 A
few moments later, the BNDD agent saw Beasley conversing with
Carriger and then saw Beasley give Carriger the green shopping
bag.90 As Beasley and Carriger began to walk away from the apartment, the BNDD agent told the other officers what happened, and
went downstairs to let them into the building.91 The agents went to
the apartment where they had seen the suspected drug transaction,
identified themselves, and forced entry.92 Carriger and Beasley were
not present during the search of the apartment, which resulted in a
clear bag of heroin being found.93 Carriger was arrested when he returned to the apartment and Beasley was arrested as he was walking
to his car.94 The green shopping bag, “discovered behind a carton on a
stairwell near Carriger’s apartment,” contained 89.5 grams of heroin.95 A search warrant was later obtained, and more heroin was found
in a safe in a storage area that was reserved for all tenants.96
The dispositive issue in Carriger was whether the entry by BNDD
agents into a locked apartment building, without permission or a warrant, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.97 Like the
other circuit court cases, Carriger dealt with a common area of an
85
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apartment building that was not accessible to the general public.98
However, unlike the other cases, the BNDD agents did not have probable cause to arrest Carriger or Beasley before they invaded an area
where Carriger had a legitimate expectation of privacy.99 The court
stated that “[a] tenant expects other tenants and invited guests to enter in the common areas of the building, but he does not expect trespassers.”100 Thus, “when . . . an officer enters a locked building, without authority of invitation, the evidence gained as a result of his
presence in the common areas of the building must be suppressed.”101
Ultimately, the court held that tenants do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the locked common areas of their apartment buildings, and that officers’ unlawful entry into these areas are violative of
tenants’ Fourth Amendment rights.102
C.

The Sixth Circuit’s Position is Only a Starting Point

The Sixth Circuit’s approach to the Fourth Amendment in the
locked common area context provides a firm foundation for the Supreme Court to resolve this important constitutional issue. Previous
scholarship has argued that the Sixth Circuit’s understanding of the
Fourth Amendment is a good starting point.103 However, it is important to note that, although the Sixth Circuit’s position in Carriger
may be a good starting point, it is only that; there are shortcomings to
overcome. Most notably, the holding in Carriger is limited to a particular set of facts and can only realistically extend Fourth Amendment
98

Id. at 549.
Id. at 547.
100
Id. at 551; see also, e.g., Piazolla v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding
that although university students may have no justifiable expectation of privacy against an inspection of their rooms pursuant to university regulations, they do have a justifiable expectation
of privacy against an intrusion made for the purpose of obtaining evidence in a criminal investigation).
101
Carriger, 514 F.2d at 552.
102
Id. at 550. This holding stood in direct conflict with the Second Circuit’s holdings in United States v. Miguel, 340 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that the lobby of a high-rise building where the officers arrested the defendant was not within the defendant’s curtilage even
though the officers gained entry to the lobby when the entrance door was opened by a woman
leaving the building) and United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment protection accorded to an apartment dweller’s home does not extend to
an area just inside a hallway door that was meant to be kept locked and which could only be
opened by tenant’s keys or buzzes from tenants; but testimony indicated that the lock was broken and could be opened by almost any key).
103
See Sean M. Lewis, The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway: Do Tenants Have a Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of Their Apartment Buildings?,
101 MICH. L. REV. 273, 278 (2002) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit’s approach is superior to that
adopted by the majority of circuits because it drew connections to the facts and analysis both in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451
(1948)).
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protection to the hallways in apartment buildings. Whether intentional or not, the Sixth Circuit did not explicitly extend Fourth Amendment protection to the other common areas mentioned in the case, including the stairwell where the green shopping bag was found or the
storage space in the basement where one of the safes of heroin was
found. The Sixth Circuit’s failure to be more inclusive of different
common areas in Carriger means that it will be more difficult to apply
Carriger to other cases with different common areas in the future.
With that said, it would be unfair to say that no progress towards
more expansive Fourth Amendment protections has been made. The
courts have limited police’s ability to enter a locked building without
permission or warrant, or to have a drug dog sniff the porch of a house
or the door of apartment.104 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as exemplified by Kyllo v. United States,105 also maintains that law enforcement officers are not allowed to use advanced technology to learn
facts about the inside of a residence that were previously unknowable
without physical entry.106 The issue in Kyllo was whether governmental use of a thermal-imaging device “to detect relative amounts of
heat” within a private home amounted to a “search” for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment.107 In this case, government agents suspected
that marijuana was being grown in the defendant’s home and decided
to use a thermal-imaging device to scan the home to determine whether the heat emanating from the home was consistent with the use of
high-intensity heat lamps typically used to grow marijuana plants indoors.108 On the basis of this heat scan, the government agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home, and upon executing
the warrant found a marijuana growing operation involving more than
100 marijuana plants.109 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the government agents violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they scanned his home with the thermalimaging device.110 The Court held that “the use of a thermal-imaging
device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the
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See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2013) (drug dog sniffing the porch of a house);
United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 852–53 (7th Cir. 2016) (drug dog sniffing the door of an
apartment).
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533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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See id. at 34.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment” and that such a search violated
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.111
While one might worry about the technology used in Kyllo, it is
more concerning that law enforcement agencies use even more advanced technologies for surveillance and have yet to fully disclose the
details of these technologies. These technologies are much more intrusive than a drug-dog sniffing the outside of a door or a thermal scanner searching for heat signatures from across the street. News articles
indicate that there are high-tech radar devices that allow police officers to effectively see through the walls of a house.112 These radars
“work like finely tuned motion detectors, using radio waves to detect
movements as slight as human breathing from more than 50 feet
away. They can detect whether anyone is inside of a house, where they
are and whether they are moving.”113 Other technologies that can map
the interiors of buildings and locate the people within them are being
developed by the Justice Department.114
Unfortunately, police officers are doing more than simply surveilling residences from a public street. The bigger problem is that sometimes police officers are unlawfully and forcefully entering into private, limited-access buildings in the hopes of finding illicit substances
or obtaining evidence of illegal activity.115 While it is established that
a person growing marijuana in his home enjoys Fourth Amendment
protection from thermal-imaging technology, it is still unclear whether
a tenant living in an apartment building is free from unwarranted intrusions by law enforcement officers into the common areas of his or
her apartment building. Extending Fourth Amendment protections to
common areas in apartment buildings could prove vital to protecting
tenants’ privacy and security interests from more intrusive technology
and practices that will be utilized in the future, and ensuring justice is
carried out fairly.
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Id. at 29, 40.
Brad Heath, New Police Radars Can ‘See’ Inside Homes, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2015)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/01/19/police-radar-see-through-walls/22007615/ [http
s://perma.cc/BN2W-NV7Z].
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Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), with United States v. Carriger, 541
F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976), and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); see also United
States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that Sweeney did not have any
rights in basement crawl space of his multi-unit apartment from which police seized incriminating evidence).
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IV. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT TENANTS HAVE A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE COMMON AREAS OF THEIR
APARTMENT BUILDINGS
The Supreme Court has shown a commitment to protecting privacy in and around the home. This commitment could support an expansion of Fourth Amendment protection to tenants from unauthorized,
warrantless searches by law enforcement officers in the common areas
of apartment buildings. Specifically, this Part will demonstrate that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida v. Jardines, along with the
curtilage doctrine, can be used as a springboard for circuit courts to
recognize that tenants have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the common areas of their apartment buildings.
A.

Supreme Court Precedent Supports Extending Fourth Amendment Protection to Common Areas in Apartment Buildings

Historically, courts have not extended curtilage protection to the
common areas of multi-unit dwellings, though they have recognized
curtilage protection of similarly proximate spaces surrounding singlefamily homes.116 The reason the circuit courts have been reluctant to
grant curtilage to common areas might be because, to date, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the precise question of whether a tenant
has a reasonable expectation of privacy within the common areas of
their apartment building. The closest case that the Supreme Court
has heard on this issue is Florida v. Jardines,117 but that case dealt
with a single-family home. In Jardines, the police used a drug-sniffing
dog to investigate the porch outside of the Jardines’ house based on a
tip that marijuana was being grown inside.118 The dog alerted the police to the presence of marijuana and the police used that information
to receive a warrant to search the residence.119 In finding the Jardines’
porch to be curtilage, the Court wrote:

116

Compare United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1256–57 (3d Cir. 1992) (arguing that
courts may need to apply the Dunn factors differently in urban settings, and then holding that
the backyard of an apartment building was not the tenants’ curtilage on the facts of the case),
and United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that the parking
garage of an apartment building was not the tenants’ curtilage, and stating that “[i]n a modern
urban multifamily apartment house, the area within the ‘curtilage’ is necessarily much more limited than in the case of a rural dwelling subject to one owner’s control”), with United States v.
Reilley, 76 F.3d 1271, 1279 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the curtilage of defendant’s home extended to a cottage located 375 feet from the main residence—a single-family home—because the entire property was enclosed by a fence).
117
569 U.S. 1 (2013).
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Id. at 3–4.
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Id. at 4.
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At the [Fourth] Amendment’s very core stands the right of a
[person] to retreat into [his or her] own home and there be free
from unreasonable government intrusion. . . . We therefore regard the area immediately surrounding and associated with
the home—what our cases call the curtilage—as part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.120
Interestingly, the Court did not apply the Dunn factors or any other
test to determine that Jardines’ porch was curtilage. Instead, the
Court cited Oliver stating that “the conception defining curtilage . . . is
easily understood from our daily experience. . . . Here there is no
doubt that the officers entered it.”121
There is no substantive reason to distinguish the front porch in
Jardines from common areas in apartment buildings that are not open
to the general public. Like the residents of a single-family home, tenants in an apartment building possess property interests in their
locked common areas. If anything, locked common areas in apartment
buildings deserve more protection than the front porch of a singlefamily home because they are generally more inaccessible and less visible to the general public. Of course, a greater number of people probably walk through a hallway of a typical apartment building each day
than walk onto a single-family home’s porch. However, the quantity of
people who have access to a common area is less important than the
type of person who has access. What if there was a large single-family
home that had ten, twenty, or thirty people living in it? For example,
the owner of a single-family home could rent out several rooms in his
or her home to multiple individuals or families through Airbnb. Under
these circumstances, the owner’s right to privacy should not be questioned or diminished simply because there are more people living
there than the average single-family home. On a related note, would it
even matter whether all of the people living in a single-family home
were actually related to one another? Probably not, since a family can
take on many forms. Similarly, the fact that there are lots of people
living in an apartment building should not completely discount an individual tenant’s right to privacy.
More importantly, both the front porch and the common areas in
apartment buildings are “subject to entry, passage, and occupation by
persons other than the resident in question.”122 Just as a resident in a
single-family home expects various people—the mailman, the meter
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Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
182 n.12 (1984)).
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Fifield, supra note 67, at 172.
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maid, the pizza delivery person, the landscaper—to encroach onto
their front porch/yard to some degree, the tenant in an apartment
building expects various people—residents, their guests, the landlord,
maintenance professionals—to legitimately enter their apartment
building and have some level of access to their common areas, especially the hallways. The Court in Jardines recognized that “residents
of any type of home may not always have the power, right, or ability to
exclude others from the area immediately surrounding their home, yet
that space is nonetheless protected as curtilage.”123 To that end, once
an individual, particularly a law enforcement officer, has exceeded the
scope permitted by the “license” to physically enter or pass through
one’s property, it becomes an objectively unreasonable trespass and
entitles the resident to Fourth Amendment protection.124
Because of the similar characteristics between front porches and
apartment common areas, courts should be more inclined to use
Jardines to provide Fourth Amendment protection to tenants in
apartment buildings. The power to exclude others should no longer be
a determinative factor in whether a tenant should have Fourth
Amendment protection in a common area of their apartment building.
Instead, “the relevant inquiry is first whether the area in question is
curtilage,” and then whether the non-resident, law enforcement officer
is within the scope of his or her property right to be there.125
The Seventh Circuit, perhaps most notably in its Whitaker decision, became the first appellate court to apply the Jardines ruling to
the common area of an apartment building. In Whitaker, the court
claimed to extend the Jardines analysis, noting that:
Whitaker’s lack of a right to exclude did not mean he had no
right to expect certain norms or behavior in his apartment
hallway. . . . [T]he fact that a police officer might lawfully walk
by and hear loud voices from inside an apartment does not
mean he could put a stethoscope to the door to listen to all that
is happening inside. . . . This means that because other residents might bring their dogs through the hallway does not
mean that police can park a sophisticated drug-sniffing dog
outside an apartment door, at least without a warrant.126
However, it was pointed out that the court in Whitaker based its rationale on the privacy interests in Kyllo rather than the property in-
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Id. at 173; see also Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7.
Fifield, supra note 67 at 173.
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United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2016).
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terests in Jardines.127 Some argue that by applying the more openended reasonable expectations of privacy standard, Whitaker missed
the opportunity “to extend the . . . property-based rationale and provide a stronger foundation for the equal allotment of Fourth Amendment protections.”128 Despite this, the Whitaker and Jardines decisions, taken together, hopefully indicate that more courts will begin to
recognize common areas in apartment buildings as part of tenants’
curtilage.
The reasons courts should rely more on the curtilage doctrine in
these cases rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
are not discussed enough. One reason for relying more on the curtilage
doctrine is that protecting privacy through the reasonable expectation
of privacy doctrine is prone to circumvention. It has already been established that a determination of a subjective expectation of privacy
can sometimes be preempted by the determination that the objective
expectation of privacy was unreasonable.129 If Fourth Amendment protections are based on subjective expectations of privacy, then changing
people’s expectations would allow for greater government intrusion.
To provide an extreme example, what is stopping the government from
issuing a statement in a press conference that people should no longer
expect privacy in the common areas of their building? The likely answer is fear of public and legislative blowback. Also, public expectations of privacy do not shift overnight.130 Still, it will be important for
courts to keep both the inevitable advancement of technology and the
flaws of the existing reasonable expectations of privacy standard in
mind when trying to develop a sustainable and flexible Fourth
Amendment standard that can effectively apply to and resolve a growing number and variety of situations within the multi-unit dwelling
context.
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United States v. Whitaker: Seventh Circuit Holds that Warrantless Dog Sniffs Outside Defendant’s Apartment Door Violate Fourth Amendment, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1040, 1040 (2017).
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Id. at 1043–44.
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See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the resident
of an unlocked apartment building lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
buildings common areas); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is unclear whether Nohara had a subjective expectation of privacy in his building and hallway. However, we need not decide this issue because we conclude that any expectation Nohara might have
had is not one that society recognizes as reasonable.”).
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See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1812 (2017) (finding that popular expectations of privacy are not
highly responsive to changes in legal rules; they are stubborn); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“In such circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations
had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those
subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was.”).
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Extending Fourth Amendment Protection to Common Areas in
Apartment Buildings is Good Public Policy

Extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to common
areas in apartment buildings can not only be supported by precedent,
but it is also good public policy. Fourth Amendment privacy rights
should not depend on a person’s style of housing. Having two different
Fourth Amendment standards—one for single-family homes and one
for apartments—affects the poorer citizens in society because they are
more likely to live in apartments.131 While this Comment realizes that
there are affluent people who live in apartments and less affluent
people who live in single-family homes, it is more likely that one
makes less money if one lives in the former than if one lives in the latter. In 2016, the median income for renter-occupied households was
$37,264, while the median income for owner-occupied households was
almost twice that amount at $73,127.132 The disparity in Fourth
Amendment protection could also be framed as an urban versus rural,
rather than a rich versus poor, dynamic. However, these two sets of
contrasting characteristics most accurately depict the extent of Fourth
Amendment protection when they are combined together. The urban
poor, in particular, are uniquely positioned to experience the inequities of the Fourth Amendment as compared to their wealthier, rural or
suburban counterparts.133 Some argue that the deficiency is so great
that a “poverty exception” to the Fourth Amendment exists in our jurisprudence.134 Thus, extending privacy to common areas in apartments could help combat the uneven distribution of Fourth Amendment protection perpetuated by geographical and class dynamics.
131

See Lewis, supra note 103, at 306 n.229 (“Poor tenants, especially minorities, are much
more likely to live in neighborhoods subject to close police scrutiny and are, therefore, more likely to feel the sting of unbridled police discretion.”); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 678 (1994) (minorities are disproportionately more likely to be stopped and frisked).
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U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_1YR_B25119&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/72CX-S49X].
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See generally William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (1999) (explaining that while poverty is not exclusively an urban phenomenon, concentrated urban poverty creates its own set of issues—those who live in cities tend
to live in apartment buildings and spend more time on the street, two situational contexts that
afford them less privacy); see also Kami Chavis Simmons, Future of the Fourth Amendment: The
Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
240, 272 (2014) (explaining that there is also a racial component to the distribution of Fourth
Amendment privacy rights).
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See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 406–07 (2003) (positing that an implicit but very real “exception” to the Fourth
Amendment exists and that, even though Supreme Court case law sounds neutral on its face, its
effect is discriminatory upon urban poor residents for whom privacy protections were not designed).
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Also, ensuring broad privacy protection allows for a more equitable balance between the needs of law enforcement and the Fourth
Amendment interests of tenants. Extending the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection to cover the common areas of an apartment
building does not restrict the ability of law enforcement officers to do
their jobs because they are still free to enter and search the common
areas of apartment buildings if they obtain permission from a landlord
or another person with the authority to grant access to the property
(e.g., the board of directors of a condominium or homeowners association). Moreover, preventing law enforcement officers from entering
and searching common areas of apartment buildings without a warrant or permission from a landlord protects the privacy interests of the
tenants.
Here, critics might argue that expanding Fourth Amendment protections to apartment building common areas would not protect the
privacy interests of all tenants. Critics would point out that there are
some tenants who would prefer to grant law enforcement officers
greater access to their building and thus, have less privacy, if that
meant lowering or preventing crime in their apartment building.
However, it is not clear whether granting law enforcement more access to the common areas of apartment buildings would lead to lower
or even prevent crime.135 In some circumstances, granting law enforcement more access to the common areas of apartment buildings
could create more problems than it solves. There is no doubt that if we
relaxed restrictions on search and seizure, more people would end up
in prison. Granted, that would probably mean that more people who
deserved to be in prison were being sent to prison, but that would also
probably mean that more innocent people, or people not intended to be
the target of particular laws (e.g., a person who recreationally smokes
marijuana in the privacy of his home as compared to a major cocaine
dealer), would be sent to prison as well.
One solution might be for property managers or landlords of
apartment buildings to adopt a policy or a rule granting access to police to the common areas of the apartment building. On one hand,
adopting such a policy or rule would give notice to the tenants and
would likely reduce their expectation of privacy in the common areas
of the apartment building. Such an approach may also more effectively
135

See Monica Davey, Chicago to Hire Many More Police, but Effect on Crime Is Debated,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/chicago-to-hire-manymore-police-but-effect-on-crime-is-debated.html [https://perma.cc/H3V5-Z4KY] (“[P]olicing experts and criminologists say that increasing the size of a police force does not ensure a decrease
in crime. Jim Bueermann, the president of the Police Foundation, a nonprofit group focused on
improving policing, said that once a police department reached a needed minimum number of
officers, the equation was not as simple as more police equals less crime.”).
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deter tenants from conducting criminal activities on the premises. On
the other hand, law enforcement officers’ power under such a policy
could go unchecked and result in the routine violation of Fourth
Amendment rights. This is what happened in Operation Clean Halls,
one of the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk programs that
allowed law enforcement officers to patrol thousands of private
apartment buildings, most of which were inhabited by Black and Latino tenants, across New York City.136 At the very least, one could argue that this approach would allow some tenants to self-select out of
or into the apartment building that best reflected their views on privacy. It is important to keep in mind, however, that low-income tenants often lack the financial resources to actually self-select out of or
into an apartment building of their choice, so an alternative solution
might be required.
Perhaps this issue could be resolved through legislative means rather than through the judiciary. Congress or a state legislature could,
in theory, pass a law that granted law enforcement officers unfettered
access to the common areas of multi-unit buildings and relieve the
courts of having to deal with this circuit split. However, much like the
government trying to change popular expectations of privacy overnight with a radical press announcement, practical realities suggest
that fear of public blowback to such policy changes, harbored by either
Congress or, to a lesser extent, property managers and landlords,
would likely prevent either scenario from happening.
As a matter of public policy, society should not declare that tenants who choose to live in apartment buildings lose all legitimate
claims of privacy in the common areas of their apartment building because of their proximity to other tenants and their guests. While tenants neither do nor should expect to enjoy complete privacy in the
common areas of their buildings, a tenant’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in those areas should be treated as a more substantive protection against warrantless and permission-less searches by law enforcement officers than it is today. Additionally, with the continuous
advancement of technology and the increasing ease of government intrusion, extending protections to the common areas in apartments
could help create a level playing field between those individuals who
live in apartments and those who live in single-family homes. In short,
the privacy and security interests an individual has in the areas close
to the home do not disappear merely because that individual lives in
an apartment building or another type of multi-unit dwelling.
136

See Julie Turkewitz, In New York, a 20-Year-Old Policy Suddenly Prompts a Lawsuit, THE
ATLANTIC (May 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/05/in-new-york-a-20year-old-policy-suddenly-prompts-a-lawsuit/256584/ [https://perma.cc/9ATF-EVVN].
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Similarly, courts should not immediately dismiss tenants’ privacy
interests and claims because they are not absolute.137 To say that
common areas, which are open to use by other tenants and their
guests, offer no shield of privacy or protection ignores practical reality.138 Certainly, an apartment garage that is only open to tenants that
have paid an additional monthly fee and acquired the appropriate
means of access (e.g., a keycard) offers those tenants a certain level of
privacy and protection from other tenants who have not paid that additional fee and especially from the general public. Cases mentioned in
this Comment show that tenants do rely on the privacy of locked
common areas and are consequently led to deposit various items in
designated private storage areas, at the end of hallways, or in stairwells, albeit with improper motives.139 Consequently, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should make room to protect tenants’ privacy interests where tenants have taken precautions to exclude unauthorized
persons from the common areas of their apartment buildings.
The Fourth Amendment confers “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects” and does so without
distinguishing among the types of dwellings that may comprise “houses.” The protections of the Fourth Amendment are too strong and too
important for our courts to grant them in an unequal and unjust
manner. It is bad enough to think that law enforcement officers are
conducting unlawful searches in and around our homes. However, it
might be worse knowing that they are searching some of our homes—
apartment buildings—and not others.
V.
A.

NEW PERSPECTIVES THAT CAN HELP RESOLVE THE CURRENT
CIRCUIT SPLIT

Four Alternative Models of Fourth Amendment Protection

Courts have long used the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard to define searches under the Fourth Amendment, albeit to
the chagrin of most scholars in the legal community. As many have
realized, the doctrine is subjective, unpredictable, and sometimes confusing.140 However, viable alternatives to the reasonable expectations
137

See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 458 (1948) (Jackson, J. concurring) (“[E]ach
tenant of a building, while he has no right to exclude from the common hallways those who enter
lawfully, does have a personal and constitutionally protected interest in the integrity and security of the entire building against unlawful breaking and entry.”).
138
See, e.g., United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The locks on the doors
to the entrances of the apartment complex were to provide security to the occupants.”).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976).
140
See, e.g., ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 46 (2003) (“How do we know what society is prepared to
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of privacy standard, while slow to emerge, have been discussed and
are available for consideration. According to Orin Kerr, there are four
alternative models of Fourth Amendment protection that the Supreme
Court should recognize: (1) a “probabilistic model,” (2) a “private facts
model,” (3) a “positive law model,” and (4) a “policy model.”141 Kerr
provides a summary of what each model entails:
The probabilistic model considers the likelihood that the subject’s information would become known to other or the police.
The lower the likelihood, the more likely it is that a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists. The private facts model asks
whether the government’s conduct reveals particularly private
and personal information deserving of protection. This approach focuses on the information government collects rather
than how it is collected. The positive law model considers
whether the government conduct interferes with property
rights or other legal standards outside the Fourth Amendment.
When courts apply the positive law model, an expectation of
privacy becomes reasonable when it is backed by positive law
such as trespass. The fourth and final model, the policy model,
reflects the direct approach. Courts applying the policy model
focus directly on whether the police practice should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment.142
Each of these models of Fourth Amendment protection have their own
strengths and weaknesses.143 Because of this, Kerr argues that having
multiple models of Fourth Amendment at one’s disposal is better than
having only one model. Kerr explains that no one model can provide
the exclusive guide to Fourth Amendment protection: each model
works quite well in some cases and fails in others.144 For example, the
policy model identifies police practices that are reasonable per se and
separates those from intrusive police practices that could only be reasonable in certain situations.145 When a court applies the policy model,
it determines whether a range of practices should be regulated.146
However, no consistent method exists for identifying the proper range
accept as reasonable? Because there is no straightforward answer to this question, ‘reasonable’
has largely come to mean what a majority of Supreme Court Justices says is reasonable.”).
141
See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 503
(2007).
142
Id. at 506.
143
Kerr discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each of these models, but this Comment
does not discuss them in detail.
144
Id. at 534.
145
Id. at 536.
146
Id. at 537.
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of practices, which means that courts are unlikely to pick the same
range. This leads to inconsistent rules being developed in the court
system.147 Consequently, “the policy model cannot provide an exclusive
guide to Fourth Amendment protection.”148
Unlike Kerr, Professors William Baude and James Y. Stern argue
that Fourth Amendment protection should be based solely on the positive law model.149 Rather than focusing on whether the expectations of
privacy are reasonable for an individual or a place, the positive law
model focuses on government actors and their actions. The question
the positive law model asks is: “[H]as a government actor done something that would be unlawful for a similarly situated nongovernment
actor to do?”150 If we apply the positive law model to the facts in Kyllo,
for example, the question we would ask would be something like:
Would an ordinary citizen breach any kind of legal duty by using a
thermal-imaging device that detects relative amounts of heat to learn
about what is going on inside a stranger’s house?
When determining whether there has been a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, courts could first ask whether law enforcement
officers have committed an act that is tortious, criminal, or violative of
some legal duty. For example, whether the law enforcement officer
was trespassing on the property would be vitally important in determining whether there was an unconstitutional search or not. This
would depend on whether the law enforcement officer received permission or consent from a party authorized to give such permission or
consent before entering the premises.151 From there, the courts could
move on to reasonable expectation of privacy and curtilage considerations. Whether this or another approach is adopted, a systematic progression of evaluative steps could be valuable in assigning Fourth
Amendment protection.
Regardless of whether one believes in multiple models or a single
model of Fourth Amendment protection, there is sufficient reason to
believe that the underlying analysis employed by the circuit courts
might benefit from a reexamination of the reasonable expectation of
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Id.
Id.
149
See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2016) (“We argue that Fourth Amendment protection should be
anchored in background positive law. . . . In short, Fourth Amendment protection should depend
on property law, privacy torts, consumer laws, eavesdropping and wiretapping legislation, antistalking statutes, and other provisions of law generally applicable to private actors, rather than
a freestanding doctrine of privacy fashioned by courts on the fly.”).
150
Id. at 1831.
151
Id. at 1876.
148
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privacy standard and a greater focus on different evaluative perspectives on Fourth Amendment protection.
B.

Locked or Unlocked: A Relevant but Non-Determinative Factor

Another way that courts can help clear up some of the confusion
in this space is by not making Fourth Amendment protection depend
on whether a common area is locked or unlocked. Most cases and legal
scholarship have explored Fourth Amendment protection in the locked
common space context.152 However, the distinction between locked and
unlocked common areas is arbitrary and represents unnecessary linedrawing. Interestingly enough, the problems that this distinction creates have seemingly been overlooked by the courts. Looking back to
Katz, this Comment argues that the outcome of the case should not
have depended on whether the door to phone booth was closed or open,
locked or unlocked. If the door to the phone booth had been left slightly ajar, the wiretapping of the phone booth would likely still have been
a violation of the defendant’s privacy. Also, the walls of a phone booth
are typically made of glass. Thus, the contents of a phone booth are
inherently available for the public to see. The defendant might reasonably expect for his conversation to not be heard, but surely, he
could not commit some criminal act inside of the phone booth and expect to maintain his privacy.153 Why should the rule focus on the closing and/or locking of a door rather than focus on whether the walls of
a space are see-through? It seems absurd to think that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test would protect the privacy of someone living
in a glass house with locked doors more so than the privacy of someone in an apartment common area with regular walls but unlocked
doors.
That said, the inherent differences between a phone booth and an
apartment common area do not go unnoticed. The biggest difference,
possibly, is that people using a phone booth are not expecting someone
else to be in the phone booth with them when they are using it,
whereas people in a common area of an apartment do and should expect others to share that space with them sometimes. However, if
courts are going to use a reasonable expectation of privacy standard,
they should apply it more fairly and to do that, the locked-unlocked
distinction should not be as determinative of a factor as it is.
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See Lewis, supra note 103, at 277.
One’s reasonable expectation of privacy is contextual to the means of surveillance. Some
read Katz to say that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy versus a wiretap, but not versus a trained lipreader. See John M. A. DiPippa, Searching for the Fourth Amendment, 7 UALR
L. J. 587, 616 (1984).
153
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One can see how having this distinction can be detrimental to the
efforts to protect privacy by slightly changing the facts of a case that
this Comment has already discussed. For example, take the facts of
Carriger and suppose that, instead of the police gaining entry to the
apartment by catching a door before it closed, the police had found one
of the two doors to the defendant’s apartment building to be unlocked.
Maybe, someone forgot to lock the door behind them, the buzzer system was on the fritz, or the lock on the door was broken.154 A tenant in
that apartment building should be afforded the same reasonable expectation of privacy when the door to the apartment building is locked
as when the door to the apartment building is presumed to be locked,
but actually is not. A tenant’s expectation of privacy should not depend on an ex post evaluation of the apartment building door’s locking
mechanism. Rather, a tenant’s reasonable ex ante beliefs as to the accessibility and security of the apartment building should be the key to
his or her expectation of privacy. This Comment is not suggesting that
a court should never consider whether a door was locked or not when
determining the extent of an individual’s expectation of privacy; the
locked-unlocked factor is a relevant consideration. However, courts
should realize that, often, it is outside a tenant’s control whether the
door to his or her apartment building is actually working properly. It
is even more outside the tenant’s control if a locked door is bypassed
by the police through illegitimate means. Maybe, the fact that a tenant cannot control whether an apartment building door is actually
locked makes the majority’s position easier to accept, but this does not
seem fair. By analogy, an individual living in a single-family home
cannot completely control who opens the gate to their yard, especially
if the lock on the gate is broken or, as the mailman leaves, the gate is
caught before it closes, yet he or she is still afforded an expectation of
privacy in his or her yard and home.
In addition, granting Fourth Amendment protection based on a
space being locked incentivizes law enforcement to gain entry through
manipulation, guile, or force. Several cases mentioned in this Comment involve instances in which police gained entry into the defendant’s apartment building through illegitimate means, including catching the door to the building as someone left before it closed and
preventing a garage door from closing by parking their vehicle over
the electronic sensor.155 These cases should illustrate that just because
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See United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (testimonies indicated that
the lock on the apartment building door was broken).
155
See United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976) (catching the door before
it closes); State v. Dumstrey, 873 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Wis. 2016) (preventing garage door from closing).
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an unlocked door can be opened does not mean that it should be
opened. A tenant can reasonably expect people like the landlord, other
tenants, and invited guests to have unrestricted access to the common
areas of the building, but he or she does not expect trespassers or law
enforcement officers to have the same level of access.156
The biggest counterargument is that many circuits have already
addressed the question of whether a tenant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in unlocked common areas within an apartment building and have held that there is no Fourth Amendment privacy interest.157 Perhaps, a greater focus on the trespass doctrine and other
legal concepts like fraud could help combat the majority’s stout position. Nevertheless, for the aforementioned reasons, the lockedunlocked distinction should be revisited.
Further, the concept of an apartment should be redefined: common areas of an apartment should be considered extensions of an
apartment. Tenants should be able to feel safe and secure from unwarranted intrusions in the common areas of their apartment, regardless of whether those areas are actually locked or not. Just as one
would not expect people living in a house to make sure that they
locked the door to their living room (if applicable), or their garage, or
laundry room to ensure that their privacy was protected, one should
not expect tenants in an apartment building to ensure that the common areas in their buildings are locked. Clearly, tenants who live in a
multi-unit apartment building that is open to hundreds of tenants,
visitors, workers, and others who have regular access to the common
areas in the building have a lesser expectation of privacy than people
who live in a single-family home where only their family has access.
This Comment is simply saying that the Fourth Amendment gap between the two groups is not as wide as it appears. The privacy protect-
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Law enforcement officers can be invited guests, such as when a tenant calls 911 and expects the police to come to their apartment, but the real problem is when those same officers enter the building without any kind of invitation or authorization.
157
See Lewis, supra note 103, at 274 n.5 (“The First Circuit holds that there is no Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in unlocked common areas.”); see also United States v. Hawkins,
139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1998) (“It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building.”) (citing United
States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 557–58 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding, in a case of first impression,
that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when agents entered the
apartment building’s garage without a warrant, because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage)). The Third Circuit interprets the Fourth Amendment in this manner as well. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a tenant’s zone of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment does not extend to the unlocked,
common hallways of apartment buildings). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit does not interpret the
Fourth Amendment to protect unlocked common areas. See United States v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154,
1162 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an exterior breezeway of an apartment building that is “neither enclosed nor locked”).
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tions a tenant receives should not turn on his or her ability to lock a
door or maintain complete control of a space. Instead, courts should
first look to whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to
conduct the search, whether they had a warrant (or an exception applied), and/or whether they had permission to enter the premises.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over half a century, the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard has been the coat of arms under which the Fourth Amendment has marched, seemingly ignorant of the changes imposed on residential life by the ever-evolving urban landscape. The standard, however, is ambiguous and unpredictable, suffering from a dependence on
highly subjective analyses of context and disputed facts. The Supreme
Court’s commitment to protecting privacy interests in and around the
home through concepts like curtilage calls for an interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment that provides multi-unit tenants with a propertybased, rather than a privacy-based protection, in the common areas of
their apartments from unreasonable searches and seizures. As the
weight of precedent on each side of the current circuit split grows,
there will be an increasing need for the Supreme Court to resolve this
important Fourth Amendment issue.
Accordingly, the Court should reevaluate its position on the reasonable expectation of privacy standard and consider other models of
Fourth Amendment protection. Moreover, the distinction between
locked and unlocked common areas should not be a differentiating factor when it comes to providing Fourth Amendment protection. Overall,
a more systematic approach to determining whether Fourth Amendment protection applies would help both tenants and law enforcement
better navigate the contours of privacy within the home.
Additionally, expanding Fourth Amendment protections to the
common areas of apartment buildings is good public policy. An individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights should not depend on the
style of housing that he has chosen, or in which he has been forced to
live. Having a more protective Fourth Amendment standard for single-family homes and a less protective Fourth Amendment standard
for apartment buildings disproportionately affects the less fortunate in
our society because they are more likely to reside in apartments. Also,
just because a tenant in an apartment building does not have exclusive control over a common area, such as a hallway, garage, or laundry
room, does not mean that courts should not consider these common
areas as part of the curtilage of the tenant’s home. A more uniform
treatment of the American residential landscape, including the areas
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in and around homes, would ensure that the less fortunate in our society are treated with the dignity and respect that they deserve.

